MH17: Doubts in the Intelligence Community…

Kindly translated by Anne-Marie de Grazia.

Day before yesterday, Tuesday July 29, a group of former American intelligence officers decided to publish a mémorandum questioning ambiguities and the systematic disinformation deployed by the United States government on the subject of the catastrophe of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17. Among the signatories can be found former officers of the CIA, like William Binney, former Technical Director, World Geopolitical & Military Analysis, NSA; co-founder, SIGINT Automation Research Center or David MacMichael, National Intelligence Council and Ray McGovern, former US Army infantry/intelligence officer & CIA analyst, the FBI with Coleen Rowley, Division Counsel & Special Agent, FBI, and the State Department like Larry Johnson, CIA & State Department, and Peter Van Buren, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Officer. I knew two of them during the 1990s and I can be a witness to their seriousness and to their commitment to serving their country.

This is an extremely important initiative, mirroring only the crisis the CIA knew during weeks before the invasion of Irak (2003) and coming at a time when the governments of the United States, but also of the European Union, are doing everything to rack up tensions. It is then of the utmost importance to listen to the voices of these retired intelligence officers if we want to avoid going into the trap of “FunkPropaganda”.

They are specifically targeting the Secretary of State, John Kerry, saying: “…we believe Kerry has typically rushed to judgment and that his incredible record for credibility poses a huge disadvantage in the diplomatic and propaganda maneuvering vis-a-vis Russia. We suggest you call a halt to this misbegotten “public diplomacy” offensive. If, however, you decide to press on anyway, we suggest you try to find a less tarnished statesman or woman. »

It is proof that serious and justified doubts exist in the eyes of these officers formerly in charge. These persons stress the extreme importance of maintaining a strong credibility all to the benefit of an open diplomacy. They then add: “If the intelligence on the shoot-down is as weak as it appears judging from the fuzzy scraps that have been released, we strongly suggest you call off the propaganda war and await the findings of those charged with investigating the shoot-down. If, on the other hand, your administration has more concrete, probative intelligence, we strongly suggest that you consider approving it for release, even if there may be some risk of damage to “sources and methods. This is at heart of the issue. If the US Governement has significant proofs concerning the downing of flight MH17, it is of the utmost importantce that these sources are to be released. The current position of the US Government of witholding documents to avoid damaging what is here called « sources and methods » is much too close to the position of French Army general staff in le late XIXth century when it came to accuse Captain Dreyfus. Either what you have at hands is decisive, and it has to be released or it is not, and then the best solution is silence. They positively state :

« If the U.S. has more convincing evidence than what has so far been adduced concerning responsibility for shooting down Flight 17, we believe it would be best to find a way to make that intelligence public – even at the risk of compromising “sources and methods.” Moreover, we suggest you instruct your subordinates not to cheapen U.S. credibility by releasing key information via social media like Twitter and Facebook. »

They go further, denouncing the practice and habits of the Secretary of State John Kerry and are clearly alluding to the position he took on the alleged gaz attacks in Syria last August 2013:

We are hearing indirectly from some of our former colleagues that what Secretary Kerry is peddling does not square with the real intelligence. Such was the case late last August (2013), when Kerry created a unique vehicle he called a “Government (not Intelligence) Assessment” blaming, with no verifiable evidence, Bashar al-Assad for the chemical attacks near Damascus, as honest intelligence analysts refused to go along and, instead, held their noses

This goes to prove that the Obama administration is not new to this behaviour.

They then go on:

On July 17, you joined the top leaders of Germany, France, and Russia in calling for a ceasefire. Most informed observers believe you have it in your power to get Ukrainian leaders to agree. The longer Kiev continues its offensive against separatists in eastern Ukraine, the more such U.S. statements appear hypocritical. We reiterate our recommendations of May 4, that you remove the seeds of this confrontation by publicly disavowing any wish to incorporate Ukraine into NATO and that you make it clear that you are prepared to meet personally with Russian President Putin without delay to discuss ways to defuse the crisis and recognize the legitimate interests of the various parties. The suggestion of an early summit got extraordinary resonance in controlled and independent Russian media. Not so in “mainstream” media in the U.S. Nor did we hear back from you.”

Consequently, we shall advise all journalists and all those who readily go sabre-rattling on the question of Ukraine to take note of this memorandum and to read it most carefully. The truth is now slowly emerging and could be very different from what has been said at first. Contacts I personally had in recent days with people from Intelligence Communities of other countries are saying exactly the same thing.


Citer ce billet
Jacques Sapir (2014, 1 août). MH17: Doubts in the Intelligence Community…. RussEurope. Consulté le 15 juin 2024, à l’adresse

Jacques Sapir

Ses travaux de chercheur se sont orientés dans trois dimensions, l’étude de l’économie russe et de la transition, l’analyse des crises financières et des recherches théoriques sur les institutions économiques et les interactions entre les comportements individuels. Il a poursuivi ses recherches à partir de 2000 sur les interactions entre les régimes de change, la structuration des systèmes financiers et les instabilités macroéconomiques. Depuis 2007 il s'est impliqué dans l’analyse de la crise financière actuelle, et en particulier dans la crise de la zone Euro.

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